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A

NEW LOOK AT THE ERGON ARGUMENT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Georgetown University, for SAGP 1988
It is commonly assumed that the ergon argument consists in an
inference which starts from the powers specific or peculiar to man
and arrives at a definition of the human good. This would commit
Aristotle to some form of naturalism which is either fallacious or at
least not available to us because we cannot share his views about
human nature.
The p u r p o s e of the present paper is to show that this
interpretation is unsatisfactory. Aristotle's argument is based on a
general principle which may be reformulated as follows: "For any x,
if x has an ergon y_, then x will be a good x, if and only if x
produces good instances of y.rr
The prior identification of the human ergon is then required in
order to know what to evaluate when passing judgement on whether a
human being is a good human being or not. The specification of the
ergon must be achieved in an evaluatively neutral way since the ergon
by itself does not provide any standard. I argue that this is
conveyed by the expression energeia kai praxeis meta logou.
Specifically human are all actions, right or wrong, which may be so
precisely because they are accompanied by a logos.
This in turn allows us to understand another troublesome
expression Aristotle uses to refer to the characteristic activity of
human beings: energeia kata logon e me aneu l o g o u , "activity
according to reason or not without reason." I argue that it is wrong
to take the first disjunct as referring to the part of the soul which
has reason in itself and the second one to the part of the soul which
obeys reason (Irwin). The disjunction stands for positive and
negative evaluation of human activity, respectively. To act well in
the moral, practical and theoretical domain amounts to acting
according to the logos, i.e. according to the corresponding virtues.
Failure in the moral, practical and theoretical domain, on the other
hand, is not totally irrational : the coward throws away his shield to
preserve his life, a fool deliberates well towards a bad end, and a
mistake in theoretical thought implies entertaining a logos which
happens to be false.
No inference from the ergon to the good takes place. On the
contrary, the normative weight in Aristotle's ethics is carried by
his analyses of the virtues. They provide the standards to judge good
and bad performances of the human ergon.
I
finally argue that the conclusion of the ergon argument does
not rest on metaphysical or psychological premises (although they are
not inconsistent, of course, with the doctrine of potentiality and
actuality, etc. in the Metaphysics nor with anything held in the De
Anima). Accordingly, I fail to see here an attempt to "ground a
universal answer to the question of how we should live in a theory of
human nature."

A NEW LOOK AT THE ERGON ARGUMENT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Alfonso Gomez-Lobo
Georgetown University
Recent discussion of Aristotle's inference of the definition Of
eudaiinonia has focused, as far as I can see, on three important
problems: whether Aristotle is successful in showing that man has a
function or not, whether the premises of the argument are dialectical
as opposed to metaphysical/psychological (or perhaps even of a
different sort), and whether the wording of the conclusion commits
him to an inclusive or a dominant conception of the human good.l

At the outset of the present paper I would like to leave these
issues unresolved in order to examine first how the argument actually
works. Towards the end I shall be in a position to say a word or two
about them.

I see two reasons to reopen the debate on this aspect of the
ergon argument. On the one hand, there is a widely held way of
understanding the argument which seems to commit Aristotle to sane
form of fallacious naturalism. There has been sane opposition to
this, but I think a more precise argumentation can be offered against
it. On the other hand, one of the most authoritative English
translations of the N.E. circulating today (that of T. Irwin) 2 seems
to me to give a highly misleading rendering of the argument. Given
the influence of this translation in the teaching of Aristotelian
ethics at different levels, I think it is important to call attention
to what may well be a more correct rendering of a crucial passage.

I
I would like to start by giving a few examples of the general
view that I shall criticize. I take them from two works that are
likely to fall into the hands of anyone studying the N.E. today.

In the second edition of W.F.R. Hardie's well known book on
Aristotle* Ethical Theory we read that

"...starting from the conceptions of the powers which
are specific or peculiar to men as members of the class
of living beings, Aristotle arrives at a tentative
definition of the human good (1097 a 33 - 1098 a 20). "3

Although the expressions "starting from" and "arriving at" are
somewhat vague, there is a suggestion here that an argumentative step
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is taken from a psychological premise about human powers or dynameis
to the ethical notion of the human good.
In the excellent anthology of Essays on Aristotle's Ethics
edited by A. 0. Rorty something similar is held by K. Wilkes. She
writes:

"A study of man's ergon, then, can tell us what it is
to be a good man, once we have discovered just what
activities are indeed characteristic of mankind."^

Since "what it is to be a good man" stands for an evaluative
question, indeed the question which is answered by giving a
definition of the human good or happiness, we here have once again
the idea of some kind of inference fron the ergon of man to a basic
ethical notion.

In the same collection of articles T. Nagel goes even further
when he holds that

"The proper ergon of man, by which human excellence is
measured, is that which makes him a man rather than
anything e l s e . ( m y emphasis, not Nagel's)

I am not sure I am being uncharitable in the interpretation of
this quotation, but it does suggest to me that the ergon of man is
expected to provide something like a measuring rod to determine the
value of actions and/or persons. If these accord with the ergon, then
they are good; if they accord perfectly, then they are excellent. It
would not be difficult to rephrase this kind of relation between a
measuring rod or standard and what is thereby measured in terms of
premises and conclusion. The only doubt in my mind is whether the
premise involving the ergon or characteristic activity of man is
conceived by Nagel as descriptive or as evaluative.

Regardless of this last doubt, what seems to emerge fron these
examples (and many more quotations along these lines could be easily
produced) is a pattern of interpretation of the ergon argument which
could be set out schematically as follows:

(Premise 1) "Human beings have a characteristic activity E,"
therefore,
(Conclusion)

"The good

for human

beings

is

to

exercise

the
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characteristic activity E."
A more refined version of the pattern may well include a further
premise which is both universal and evaluative and thus allows for a
valid inference:
(Premise 2) "The good of any being (or perhaps any natural or living
substance) consists in its exercising its characteristic activity or
ergon."

II
I would now like to argue that the aforementioned way of
presenting the argument is most probably wrong. I shall try to show
that Aristotle does not arrive at a definition of happiness starting
exclusively fron the powers specific to man, that a study of man's
ergon by itself cannot tell us what it is to be a good man, that the
proper ergon of man is not that by which human excellence is measured
and that the good for humans does not consist in the unqualified
exercise of the ergon.

In order to make these somewhat sweeping denials plausible, I
shall analyse the long conditional sentence in the text which
contains the inference. But before doing so, a few words must be said
about the context in which it appears.

Aristotle has argued that a correct definition of eudaimonia must
specify something which is both final, i.e. always chosen for its own
sake but never for the sake of something else, and self-sufficient,
i.e. such that it includes all basic goods.® He then proceeds to
argue that a correct definition can be found if we first ascertain
the function or ergon of man. The justification for this strategy is
given by means of a general principle which runs as follows:

(Principle 1) "For all things that have a function [ergon ti] or
activity [praxis], the good [tagathonj and the 'well'
[to eu] is thought to*reside in the function."?

There seem to be two possible ways of understanding this
principle: (a) one can take it to mean that it is good and "well" for
things that have a function to exercise that function, in which case
it would be equivalent to what I have called Premise 2, or (b) it can
be taken to express that the good and "well" for things that have a
function, i.e. the truth of a positive evaluative proposition about
them, depends on the quality of the function.
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I a m inclined to thi n k that the second is the correct
interpretation. Aristotle's inductive basis in the context includes
"a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist." If we keep in mind that
ergon also means "work" in the sense of the product of a techne or
craft, it will become clear that what he means is that a positive
judgement about a flute-player or a sculptor is the result of a
positive evaluation of the actual musical performance or of the
statue itself, respectively. A good lyre-player, Aristotle will say
in the sequel, is one who plays the lyre well.®

Just to play the lyre, i.e. the mere activation of the ergon,
cannot be good since if it is done poorly the musician turns out to
be a bad musician and it cannot be good for a musician to be a bad
musician.

The interpretation,
formulated as follows :
(Principle la)

then,

that

should be

accepted may be

"For any x, if x has an ergon
then x will
be a good- x if and only if x produces good
instances 6Έ y_."

Since for Aristotle the good for man is to be a good man, i.e. a
high quality individual of the human species, the search for the
human good requires that we first identify the characteristic
activity of man. Otherwise we may not be able to pass the prior
evaluative judgement upon which the judgement about human good ought
to be founded. This does not mean that the identification of the
ergon of man by itself will do the job. It only means that we will
know where to look for a necessary and sufficient condition to decide
when a human life is indeed a good human life. Much of what follows
will tend to reinforce this.

The ergon or defining work of man is first described by Aristotle
as
praktike tis [sc. zoej tou logon echontos
"an active life of that which has logos."9

Appealing to Politics 1325 b 14 ff., Stewart rightly indicates in
his note ad loc. that this should not be taken to restrict the human
ergon to action as opposed to contemplation. 10 It should rather be
taken in its most general sense: the defining work of man, the one
thing only humans can do, is to lead the life of the part of the soul
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which contains reason or speech. Typically human, then, is the
activation of the capacity to think. Thought and reason, however, are
present in a variety of aspects of our lives and it would be idle to
try to pin Aristotle down to some specific form of thought at this
stage of the game. Since in the argument proper there are three
further characterizations of the human ergon, I shall have more to
say about this below.

What is clear for the moment is that under the most plausible
interpretation of Principle 1 the evaluation of the life of reason
will allow xas to infer when a man is a good man.

This move, I would like to suggest, is exactly what the lengthy
conditional whose consequent txoms out to be the definition of
exodaimonia is sxipposed to accomplish.

Ill
Let us now take a closer look at the wording of the ergon
argument. I quote it in the Revised Oxford Translation with some
modifications and inserting the key Greek terms:

"Now if the function [ergon] of man is an activity of the
soul [psyches energeia] in accordance with, or not without,
rational principle [kata logon e me aneu logou], and if we
say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which
is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyreplayer, and so without qxxalification in all cases, eminence
in respect of excellence [kata ten areten] being added to
the function (for it is a mark of the lyre-player to play
the lyre, and of the good lyre-player to do so well) : if
this is the case, [and we state that the function of man is
a certain kind of life, and this an activity [energeia] and
actions [praxeis] implying a rational principle [meta
logou], and that it is a mark of the good man to perform
these well and nobly, and if any action is well performed in
accordance with the appropriate excellence [kata ten oikeian
areten]: if this is the case,] human good turns out to be
activity of soul in conformity with excellence [kat'areten],
if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with
the b e s t and m o s t complete [k a t a ten aristen kai
teleiotaten]."11

I have allowed myself to modify the ROT at two places (lines 1112 and 14) where it prints "the function of" without there really
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being an occurrence of the word ergon in the text. It is, of course,
true that the genitives that appear could tacitly depend on ergon as
supplied by the context, but it seems to me both more natural and
better suited to the flow of the argument to assume that we here have
the perfectly common construction of genitive + form of einai +
infinitive and translate "it is a mark of (noun) to (infinitive)" or
"it is peculiar to (noun) to (infinitive)".·^ What this implies is
that in this context Aristotle avoids the Use of the expression "the
ergon of the good man". Indeed, his argument relies heavily on the
assumption that this expression does not have a straightforward
referent.

How the argument is supposed to work is not at all clear. The
best I can offer by way of analysis is the following list of
ingredients :

(A) F i r s t we should note the induc t i v e basis, i.e. the
uncontroversial starting points, which seem to be represented by the
references to the lyre-player. There are two of them:
(Αχ) "a lyre-player and a good lyre-player are said to have the
same ergon."
(A2 ) "peculiar to a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and to the
good lyre-player to do so well."

(B) The second set of ingredients are the generalizations based upon
the previous instances:
(Βχ) "For any agent x who performs an ergon and any agent y_ who
peforms that ergon well, the erga are generically identical."

This principle, which is supported by (Αχ), implies that the
notion of ergon is a neutral, descriptive one. By itself the
reference to the characteristic activity of something does not convey
an evaluation of any kind. The good and bad performances are, of
course, not strictly identical, otherwise we would not pass divergent
judgements on them, but they are generically identical in that both
are performances of the same activity, an activity, I would venture
to say, which can be established in both cases by the same kind of
quasi-empirical, or direct, inspection.

This is further conveyed by the second generalization:

(B2 ) "In order to distinguish between an unqualified performer
and a good performer of an ergon, eminence in respect to excellence
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has to be added to the specification of the ergon."
This is supported by (A2 ) and states that there is no ergon
peculiar to the good performer. His ergon is simply the ergon of any
performer but with something added to it: its excellence. (B2 ) also
seems to indicate that the evaluative judgement about the performance
of an ergon is logically independent of the discovery and neutral
description of the characteristic activity of a given class of
objects or persons. Perhaps an apt way to illustrate this would be to
say that someone who travels to a distant country, e.g. to India, can
realize that in that country certain individuals play an instrument
similar to the lyre. But to judge which of those musicians are good
performers and which are not requires an altogether different kind of
expertise based on adequate knowledge of the conventions governing
musical performance within that culture. This judgement represents
something over and above the mere realization that sane individuals
produce generically the same sounds by playing the same instrument.

If the foregoing is correct, Aristotle would be saying that in
order to identify a good F (or the goodness for Fs) two logically
distinguishable steps must be taken: first, the ergon of Fs has to be
ascertained in a non-evaluative manner, and then, an evaluative
judgement as to what counts as a good performance of that erp;on has
to be passed. Ihis latter judgement is equivalent to finding the
arete or are tai corresponding specifically to the class of Fs. The
ergon and the good are thus not strictly identical.

All of this is supposed to hold for particular human activities.
The last ingredient then moves on to
(C) the application of the foregoing to the case of man as such.

Virtually all commentators I have consulted fail to realize that
what Aristotle requires in the context, as a first step, is a
neutral, purely descriptive specification of the ergon of man. This
has led to a rather muddled account of the different formulae in the
text in which the term lógos appears (kata logon e me aneu logou,
meta logou) . Another factor that has contributed to the general
confusion. I believe, is the difficulty in using such terms as
"reason", "rational" or "rationally" in English and other languages
without conveying a positive evaluation. It is odd to say that
someone conducted her actions with reason
and to add that her
actions were blameworthy.

A close look at the text will show that, apart from the
specification of the ergon of man prior to the argument itself ("an
active life of that which has the logos" ) , there are three
expressions within the argument that are tosed to refer to it:
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(i)

psyches energeia kata logon e me aneu logou,

(ii)

psyches energeia kai praxeis meta logou, and

(iii)

psyches energeia.13

It seems clear that (iii) is a short-hand reference back to (i)
and/or (ii). One should expect, of course, that these two will be
equivalent, but how, exactly?

T. Irwin in his translation achieves a certain equivalence by
rendering (ii) by "the soul's activity and actions that express
reason" and (i) by "the soul's activity that expresses reason [as
itself having reason] or requires reason [as obeying reason]" (his
brackets).^
I find this unsat is factory on several grounds. First, to
translate here and elsewhere kata with the accusative by "expressing"
is rather misleading because the reader tends to loose sight of the
normative implications of the Greek. One's actions may or may not
express something, but this is quite different from whether they
follow or fail to follow a rule or principle. An action may display a
rule by not following it. Second, the two occurrences of logos in (i)
are asigned by Irwin by means of the expressions in brackets to
reason proper and to the appetitive part of the soul, respectively.
This is unconvincing because the virtues of the appetitive part, i.e.
the moral virtues, not only require reason, but are precisely
instances of acting kata logon, in accordance with reason. This is
w h a t obeying reason amounts to in their case. 15 Third, the
expressions kata logon and mata logou are vised elsewhere by Aristotle
to mark a contrast between two different things. It is therefore
dangerous to lump them together voider one single English expression.

The contrast I have in mind between kata and meta preceeding the
term logos is found in N.E. VI. 13, a passage in which Aristotle
criticises the Socratic conception of moral virtue. There, among
other things, he says:
"...it is not merely the state in accordance with right
reason [kata ton orthon logon], but the state that implies
the presence of right reason [meta tou orthou logou], that
is excellence."!®
In his commentary Grant relies heavily on this passage for his
interpretation of 1.7. Indeed, he understands the transition from
kata logon to meta logou in the passage from the first book as
------follows:0
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MA machine might be said to move kata logon, 'in accordance
with a law', but not meta logon, 'with a consciousness of a
law. ' It is this consciousness of the law which, according
to H egel, distinguishes morality (Moralitaet) fron mere
propriety (Sittlichkeit),"1?
As his words show. Grant is taking both expressions involving
logos in an evaluatively positive sense. This also holds for his
understanding of me aneu logon on which he comments in the following
terms:
"In the euphues and the sophron, where desires flow
naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be
pres u p p o s e d (hou ouk aneu) than directly to assert
itself."18
“

As I have already suggested, this is unsatisfactory because if
anything can be properly described as action kata logon is is surely
sophrosyne. Here it is not so much a question of reason "asserting''
itself but rather of reason being in fact followed. To say that
temperance is "not without reason" would be a very weak description
of what counts as rational behaviour par excellence in the domain of
the appetitive part of the soul.

I suspect that Grant has been mislead to identify the clearly
evaluative expression neta tou orthou logou from VI. 13 with the (as I
am trying to argue) neutral phrase meta logou of 1.7. If Grant were
right in understanding the human ergon as actions not only in
accordance with a law (his translation of logos), but also with a
consciousness of a law, Aristotle would be committing a serious
blunder by adding to that specification of the ergon, as he says we
should, the eminenece in respect to excellence or virtue:
"and it is a mark of the good man [to perform] these [sc.
the actions meta logou] well and nobly.
To consciously follow a law is already to act well and nobly.
Therefore, the addition that the good man performs them well and
nobly is a mistaken reduplication. I conclude, then, that the
evaluative understanding of meta logou must be abandoned.

In order to reach a satisfactory alternative interpretation it
would be useful to call to mind the passage in the Metaphysics in
which Aristotle discusses certain dynameis or capacities which are
only found "in things possessed of soul, and ip soul, i.e. in [the
part] of the soul that has logos."20 These he calls dynameis meta
logou and sets them apart from the alogoi dynameis, the capacities
that do not have logos.
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The difference between them consists in the following. A capacity
without logos produces only one effect, e.g. the hot is only capable
of heating. A capacity with logos is alike capable of contrary
effects, e.g. the medical art can produce both disease and health.
The reason for this, Aristotle explains, is that "the logos
manifests the thing itself and its privation’ll
"for it is by
denial and removal that it manifests the contrary."22

To show how this is supposed to work would require extensive
textual analysis. The important consideration for the present
purposes is that being meta logou is no guarantee for a good use of a
technical skill or craft. Indeed, Aristotle is willing to generalize
the point at the end of the chapter in which he has discussed the
dynameis meta logou, the capacities with reason:
"It is obvious also that the potentiality [dynamis j of
merely doing [poein] a thing or having it done to one
[pathein] is implied in that of doing or having it done
well, but the latter is not always implied in the former:
for he who does a thing well must also do it, but he who
does it merely need not also do it well."23

The conclusion I would venture to draw from this passage (which
incidentally shows a clear awareness on the part of Aristotle of the
fallacy of going from fact to value) is that we now have a clue to
understand Aristotle’s reference to the ergon of man by means of the
phrase "activity and actions meta logou". He does not have in mind
activity and actions that express reason (Irwin) in the sense of
following the logos, nor actions "indissolublement unies h. la regle"
(Gauthier-Joliv) because seme of them may be in clear violation of a
rule.

What Aristotle has in mind are simply actions, right or wrong,
which may be so prescisely because they are accompanied by a logos or
awareness of a propositional account of some sort which can be
affirmed or denied by the agent. Needless to say, these are the
actions in which only humans can engage. They constitute our
characteristic activity.

If this settles the interpretation of formula (ii) we may now
reap its fruits for the interpretation of (i). What we should expect
is that meta logou in the context was meant simply to refer back to
the disjunction kata logon e me aneu logou. If this is the case, then
these should not refer to two different capacities of the soul, as
Irwin's translation suggests, but rather to the good and the bad use
of reason, respectively.
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No one will dispute, I trust, that in the domain of the
appetitive part of the soul action in conformity with reason
corresponds to the exercise of the moral virtues, i.e. to the good
use of reason within this domain. If doubts exist it should be
sufficient to quote Aristotle's closing statements on sophrosyne or
temperance in Book.Ill:
"...and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel
the power of calculation [ton logismon]. Hence they should
be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose reason [the
logos] - and this is what we call an obedient and chastened
state - and as the child should live according to the
direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should
live according to reason [kata ton logon]. Hence the
appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with
reason [the logos] ."24·
In the domain of reason itself (to logon echón)25 as opposed to
that which obeys the logos, Aristotle seems to favor a different
expression for positive evaluation. Just as in the domain of the
moral virtues kata logon is often expanded into the more precise
expression kata ton orthon logon,26 the intellectual virtues are
defined by a qualified reference to logos. Craft or techne is said to
be "a productive habit with true logos''27 and phronesis or prudence
"a practical habit with true logos.1*2° I conjecture that both in the
case of a sound medical decision and of a right prudential one
Aristotle would be willing to say that the agent acted in accordance
with reason and thereby mean that a true technical or practical
proposition accounts for the action.

To take me aneu logou in an évaluâtively negative sense, however,
seems to be the greatest challenge which the present reconstruction
has to face. Why didn't Aristotle use para logon if he wanted to
express the opposite of action performed kata Tôgon? The correct
reply is, I think, that this new expression conveys an altogether
different idea. Something that is para ton logon is outside the
demain of reason, it is something different and not just a wrong use
of reason. In 1.13 this phrase is used to introduce the appetitive or
desiring element of the soul, an element which is distinct from the
one that has the logos in the strict sense.29 Moreover, actions that
are para logon because the agent is totally out of his mind would
hardly count as specifically human.

I conjecture that what Aristotle has in mind is roughly something
of this nature: the coward, the man who throws away his shield to
preserve his life, certainly does not act according to the logos^Q ,
but his actions are not completely devoid of reason. A certain
explanation or rationalization of them is possible. The lyric poets
Archilochus, Alcaeus and Anacreon have no qualms about confessing
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the loss of their weapons to save themselves.31 By reference to their
self-preservation their actions were by no means totally irrational.

Failure in the domain of the intellectual virtues is also not
without reason. If one sets before himself a bad goal and deliberates
correctly to attain it, Aristotle would not call that an instance of
excellence in deliberation [eubloulia]. In order to apply this term
he requires that something good be attained. And yet he would not
deny that reason is at work in both cases:
"...the man who is deliberating, whether he does so well or
ill, is s e a r c h i n g for s o m e t h i n g and c a l c u l a t i n g
[logizetaij."32
Again, a failure in prudence because pleasure or pain have
"destroyed and perverted" one's judgement [hypolepsis] does not
amount to a total elimination of reason. It simply means that one has
foiled to grasp a true practical proposition and has therefore acted
on a false one.33 Something similar can be argued for, the use of
theoretical reason [to epistemonikon] although in this case the
failure to grasp the truth of a proposition cannot be attributed to
our emotions nor to the experience of pleasure and pain. A mistake in
a demonstrative science is not without logos because it still
consists in entertaining a logos, albeit a false one.

IV
I have hitherto tried to show that in the ergon argument the
Aristotelian expressions kata logon and me aneu logou correspond to
the positive and the negative evaluation of the use of reason in the
appetitive, the practical and the theoretical domain. The expression
meta logou in turn covers both of them.
Thus the premise including a reference to the human function is
not evaluative at all. It is purely descriptive. But this does not
imply that an inference from fact to value has taken place. As we
saw, Aristotle is perfectly aware that a fallacy would be involved if
that were done. The evaluative premise that allows for a valid
inference is the principle introduced at the beginning. Therefore,
the argument itself is best set out as follows:1
3
2

(1) "For any x, if x has an ergon y_, then x will be a good x, if and
only if x produces good instances of £." (= Principle la)
(2) "The ergon of man is activity with reason."
Therefore,
(3) "A human being will be a good human being if and only if he
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produces good instances of activity with reason."
If the foregoing diagnosis of the argument is correct, some
interesting consequences seem to follow for the contemporary debate.
First, it should become clear that attempts to deny that man has
an ergon or characteristic activity by producing (often amusing)
lists of human activities are certainly misguided. A recent
commentator writes:
"He [sc. Aristotle]...would see that man makes love, buys
and sells, plots revenge, collects bits of string, listens
to Mozart (or soft Lydian airs), washes his socks, travels
to Ionia (or, as it may be, Toronto), worships God, exploits
his neighbour, practices virtue, lies, cheats, murders, and
does metaphysics."^
Aristotle would, of course, see this but he surely would add that
the criterion used to set up the list in the first place is that all
of the items included are performed according to reason or at least
not without reason. Otherwise they would not belong on the list. In
other words, the human ergon is conceived by Aristotle in very
general terms and therefore does not exclude any activity, however
perverse or mistaken, as long as it involves reason.
Second, the clarification that follows the conclusion ("if there
are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most
complete") seems to point in the direction of the inclusive
interpretation. If the ergon of man is taken at a high level of
generality, then it is natural to expect that the set of good uses of
reason, i.e. of virtues, will be quite broad. Indeed, it has to be
the complete set by virtue of the self-sufficiency argument: the best
human being will be the one who, ideally, of course, activates reason
well in all domains of action with reason. If a man acts in
accordance with the virtue of the contemplative faculty but fails to
act virtuously in the moral domain, then he is not the best man.
Better than him is the practitioner of both intellectual and moral
virtues.

Third, I would very much hesitate to call the first premise a
metaphysical principle. It is of course not inconsistent with
Aristotle's doctrines of potentiality and actuality, but admission of
its truth does not require reading the Metaphysics. It seems to be
something like a common-sense principle for evaluation. Indeed, I
would say that we normally conduct our evaluations in this way. We
identify whatever is specific to the class to which an individual
belongs (the class of architects, hotels, azaleas, bull-dogs,etc.)
and then proceed to ask if this particular one represents those
activities or characteristics well.
Such

a

rule,

then,

does not

require

initiation

into

the
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subtleties of metaphysics. But this does not make it an endoxon
either because it is known to be true by any agent who exercises
rational choice.
What about the second premise, is it not grounded on Aristotelian
psychology? There is no doubt that in the quest for the human ergon
Aristotle alludes to the three layers of life he has carefully sorted
out in the De Anima. There is first the life of nutrition and growth,
then the 1ife of perception, and finally the life of the part of the
soul that has logos.^5 There is no reference in the passage of the
N . E . , however, to nous or noein, to the way noesis operates in
relation to perception or phantasia, etc., i.e. to any of the
distinctively Aristotelian positions in rational psychology. Indeed,
the characterization of the human ergon in any of its four
formulations is so vague that it hardly deserves to be called "a
psychological doctrine" at all. No study of the De Anima is required
to accept the view that humans and only humans are beings that can
give a rational account of their actions, whether such an account be
true or false, p e r s u a s i v e or u n p e r s u a s i v e , an a c c e p t a b l e
justification or a mere rationalization.

This brings me to my fourth, and last, conclusion. Apart from an
incidental use of pephyke in a rhetorical question,3° the ergon
argument does not make an explicit appeal to human nature to support
any normative conclusion. Its conclusion is evaluative, but it does
not provide any normative criteria, i.e. it does not tell us exactly
how we should conduct our lives in order to attain the human good.
The normative weight in Aristotle's ethics is carried by the analyses
of the virtues because they constitute good vises of reason. In his
ethics something ought to be done not because it is natural, but
rather because it is virtuous, i.e. good, to do it. I fail to see on
what aspect of human nature one would have to focus in order to
state, e.g. that one ought to be courageous and not play the coward,
or that one ought to be practically wise and not a fool. If human
nature is supposed to be a descriptive concept we may end in
practical perplexity because cowardice and foolishness would
certainly appear in any realistic portrait of the common features of
human beings. But if the appeal to human nature is evaluative, then
Aristotle's argument may well work the other way around: it is
because courgage is good that we are entitled to view it as hexis
kata physin, as the "natural" habit, in contrast with "unnatural"
cowardice.
I have barely touched the surface of a topic that deserves
careful treatment. I just hope that this new look at the ergon
argument will make fellow scholars think twice before attributing to
Aristotle a kind of naturalism which is not to be found at least in
the passage where one would most expect to uncover it.
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